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Does Media Exposure Affect
Financial Reporting Quality
Through Auditors?
Steven F. Cahan1, Chen Chen2 , and Rencheng Wang3
Abstract
We examine whether the media has an indirect corporate governance effect on financial
reporting quality (FRQ) that operates through auditors. This occurs because greater media
coverage can magnify an auditor’s business risk by exposing the auditor to more potential
litigation and reputation damage if an audit failure occurs. We use a path analysis to exam-
ine the direct and indirect channels of media corporate governance. We find a positive
association between media coverage and FRQ that is mediated by audit fees, and the
results are stronger for firms with greater incentives to engage in earnings manipulation. In
contrast, we find no evidence that the media has a direct corporate governance effect on
FRQ. Our results show how the media’s corporate governance reach can be extended by
auditors who care about how media coverage impacts their risk level.
Keywords
media, auditor, business risk, financial reporting quality
Introduction
In this article, we study how the media has a disciplining effect on financial reporting qual-
ity (FRQ) that operates through auditors. In our framework, auditors care about their cli-
ents’ overall media coverage because the media visibility can magnify the auditor’s
business risk which is ‘‘the risk of potential litigation costs from an alleged audit failure
and the risk of other costs, such as fee realization and reputational effects’’ (DeFond et al.,
2016, p. 71).1 The media can increase the potential loss for auditors by identifying fraud
cases, by drawing attention to the audit failure, and as Cohen et al. (2016) suggest, by sen-
sationalizing the auditor’s role in the failure.
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence indicates news articles have been used as evidence in
lawsuits against auditors. For example, in a class action suit against Friedman’s Inc. and its
auditor, Ernst & Young, the lead plaintiff included ‘‘review of news articles’’ as a source
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for evidentiary support. The plaintiff refers to specific news articles in the complaint, for
example:
110. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution published an article entitled ‘‘Woes Mount at
Friedman’s Jewelry Retailer Faces Probes, Will Restate Earnings,’’ on November 28, 2003 that
discusses Friedman’s restatement and accounting improprieties at great length. In the article,
Paul Resnik, an analyst who covers Friedman’s for J.M. Dutton & Associates stated that
‘‘[s]omething is definitely very wrong here,’’ and that what was most surprising about the bad
debt issue was that it surfaced less than two months after Friedman’s sold 3.1 million shares of
common stock. ‘‘When people do any offering, the numbers get looked at by auditors and
lawyers’’ Resnick pointed out. ‘‘Why was this not discovered before?’’ Furthermore, Charles
W. Mulford, Jr., Georgia Tech accounting professor and co-author of a book on spotting ‘‘crea-
tive accounting,’’ stated that normally, ‘‘a bad debt adjustment is not handled with a restate-
ment.’’ (In Re Friedman’s, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 52-1, 1:03-CV-3475-WSD, N.D.G.,
September 23, 2004)
The use of news articles in such cases ex post provides one link between media coverage
and auditors’ business risk. Knechel et al. (2007) note that it is standard procedure for audi-
tors to refer to media reports when assessing potential litigation and reputation risks associ-
ated with a client, consistent with auditors being concerned about a client’s media coverage
ex ante.
An auditor can respond to higher business risk in two ways: (a) the auditor can charge a
risk premium and (b) the auditor can increase audit effort to reduce the probability of an
audit failure. As a result, both a risk premium and greater audit effort will be reflected in
higher audit fees. As Bell et al. (2001) find a positive relation between auditors’ business
risk and audit hours, we expect that the increase in audit fees will reflect, at least in part,
an increase in audit effort. That is, the auditor may conduct additional work to reduce her
business risk to an acceptable level. As such, we expect that auditors have incentives to
devote extra audit effort to improve FRQ to address their business risk. As greater media
attention can magnify auditors’ business risk, these incentives will be stronger for clients
who are regularly in the media’s spotlight and are under more pressure to manipulate earn-
ings. Thus, our main expectation is that the media has a disciplining effect on FRQ that
operates through auditors and audit fees (effort).
To examine the media’s effects on FRQ through auditors, we conduct a path analysis.
Path analysis is an extension of multiple regression that allows researchers to consider
more complex models that include both direct and indirect effects (e.g., Stage et al., 2004;
Streiner, 2005).2 Path analysis is appropriate in our setting as we expect that the media can
indirectly affect FRQ through auditors. This indirect path is our primary interest.
Furthermore, using path analysis, we are able to decompose the indirect path into two path
coefficients, one for the effect of the source variable (media coverage) on the mediating
variable (audit fees) and another for the effect of the mediating variable on the outcome
variable (FRQ). Figure 1 illustrates these paths.3
In our analyses, we use data from Thomson Reuters News Analytics (TRNA), which
contains press coverage data at the client-firm level (see the ‘‘Method’’ section for more
detail) to gauge auditor’s perceived media coverage of a client. In particular, we use the
total number of news items reporting one firm in a given year as our measure of media
coverage. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that a client’s lagged media coverage
increases FRQ measured by accrual quality and that this relation is mediated through audit
fees. In contrast, we find no evidence of a direct media corporate governance effect on
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FRQ.4 Furthermore, this auditor-mediated effect becomes stronger for clients with greater
incentives to engage in earnings manipulation (e.g., more earnings-related news coverage)
(Dai et al., 2016; Matthes, 2009). These findings are consistent with the media having an
indirect corporate governance role on FRQ that operates through auditors who care about
the effect of media coverage on their business risk.
One of the challenges of our study is the endogeneity of media coverage. To address
endogeneity concerns, we conduct a battery of additional tests—a two-stage analysis, anal-
ysis with instrumental variables (IVs), and a quasi-natural experiment—and find that our
inferences do not change. Although none of those tests can fully rule out the potential
endogeneity issue, this evidence gives us greater confidence that the relation running from
media coverage to FRQ is not just correlational. Finally, we also conduct validation tests to
support our assumption that auditors face significant business risks when their clients expe-
rience high media coverage.
We contribute to the literature on the corporate governance role of the media (e.g., Core
et al., 2008; Dai et al., 2015; Dyck et al., 2008; Joe et al., 2009; Liu & McConnell, 2013).
We extend this literature by examining the effect of media coverage on firms’ FRQ. In con-
trast to prior research, we hypothesize that the media may have an indirect corporate gov-
ernance effect on FRQ. To our knowledge, we are the first to show that the media’s
governance role can operate through a third party, in this case the firm’s auditor. Thus, our
study provides a timely answer to Miller and Skinner’s (2015) call for research that pro-
vides insights into the interaction between the media and financial market intermediaries
beyond the issuers themselves.5
We also contribute to the literature that focuses on auditors’ reactions to specific news
events. While a few early studies (e.g., Joe, 2003; Mutchler et al., 1997) examine how audi-
tors react to news about a particular type of news (e.g., a loan default), how auditors
respond to a client’s general media visibility has received little attention in the literature.
One exception is the study by Gong et al. (2018). They find a positive association between
general media coverage and audit fees in China. We extend Gong et al. (2018) by examin-
ing whether media coverage has an effect on FRQ that operates through auditors.
Moreover, we (a) focus on the United States where litigation risk is particularly high, (b)
use path analysis to examine the indirect role of auditors, and (c) measure media coverage
more broadly as Gong et al. (2018) only consider articles from three newspapers in China.
The remainder of the article unfolds as follows. Section ‘‘Hypotheses Development’’ devel-
ops the hypothesis. Section ‘‘Method’’ describes the research design. Section ‘‘Empirical
Results’’ reports the main results. Sections ‘‘Endogeneity Tests’’ and ‘‘Additional Analyses’’
provide additional analyses, and section ‘‘Conclusion’’ concludes the article.
Hypotheses Development
Coverage in the media can be an indicator of investor attention, put the firm in the public
spotlight, and affect managerial decisions (e.g., Engelberg & Parsons, 2011; Hillert et al.,
2014; Solomon et al., 2014). Prior studies provide evidence of a corporate governance role
for the media. For example, Joe et al. (2009) find that following negative exposure in
Business Week, weak boards take corrective actions such as replacing the CEO and board
chair, increasing the proportion of outsiders on the board, and decreasing the use of stag-
gered boards. Liu and McConnell (2013) document that managers are more likely to aban-
don value-reducing acquisition attempts after unfavorable media coverage and find this
effect can be attributed to the media dissemination of negative news about the value-
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reducing acquisition. Similarly, Dai et al. (2015) find that insider trading profits are inver-
sely related to prior news coverage, consistent with wider dissemination creating a disci-
plining effect.
We propose that the media has an indirect corporate governance role that operates
through auditors. Auditors have strong financial and reputational incentives to constrain
opportunistic financial reporting by their clients to avoid an audit failure. Thus, we posit
that the media coverage of a firm can magnify the auditor’s business risk, which consists
mainly of litigation risk and reputation risk (e.g., DeFond et al., 2016). That is, an auditor’s
business risk is the residual risk of the auditor being sued or being unable to attract and
retain clients after reducing audit risk to an acceptable level.
Ex ante an auditor can respond to business risk in two ways: (a) the auditor can charge a
risk premium and (b) the auditor can increase audit effort to reduce the probability of an
audit failure. Bell et al. (2001) find that auditors price their business risk, suggesting a posi-
tive relation between a client’s media coverage and its audit fee. They also find that the
increase in audit fees is due to an increase in the number of audit hours worked rather than
an increase in the hourly billing rate, consistent with the auditor exerting additional effort
to reduce business risk. We expect that if auditors increase their fees in response to greater
media coverage, at least some of the fee increase will reflect a greater effort to improve
FRQ. Thus, the media may have an indirect corporate governance effect on FRQ that runs
through auditors. As auditors care about how media coverage will impact their business
risk, they have incentives to improve the FRQ of firms that are in the media spotlight.
We expect that the media’s effect on FRQ through this indirect channel will be positive.
That is, it is hard to envision a situation where an auditor would be pressured by the media
to reduce a client’s FRQ because doing so would merely increase the auditor’s business
risk by exposing her to greater litigation and reputational risk without generating any obvi-
ous benefits. Consequently, the auditor has incentives to constrain the client’s earnings
management attempts that are brought about by media coverage. It leads to the following
directional hypothesis:
Hypothesis: There is a positive indirect association between a firm’s media coverage
and FRQ that acts through audit fees.
This indirect channel has two legs. First, it predicts that a client’s media coverage will be
positively related to its audit fees. Second, it predicts a client’s audit fees will be positively
related to its FRQ.6
Method
Path Analysis
We perform a path analysis to examine whether media coverage affects FRQ. According to
Baron and Kenny (1986), a path analysis can test whether a source variable (media cover-
age) affects an outcome variable (FRQ) directly and/or indirectly through a mediating vari-
able (audit fees). Given that we wish to test the conceptual model depicted in Figure 1,
path analysis is appropriate as Stage et al. (2004) state that ‘‘[p]ath analysis is most useful
when the researcher has a clear hypothesis to test, or a small number of hypotheses, all of
which can be represented within a single path diagram’’ (p. 7). Accounting studies using a
path analysis to examine the indirect effect of a source variable on an outcome variable
4 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
include Payne and Ramsey (2008), Bhattacharya et al. (2012), DeFond et al. (2016), and
Hilary et al. (2016).
Following DeFond et al. (2016), we estimate the following system of equations:
AudFee= a0 + a1Media+ akControls
k + e ð1aÞ
FRQ= b0 + b1AudFee+ b2Media+ bkControls
k + e ð1bÞ
where Equation 1a is the standard audit fee model and Equation 1b examines the effect of
both media coverage and audit fees on FRQ. The outcome variable for the path analysis is
the client’s FRQ (FRQ) which is measured in two ways (e.g., Francis et al., 2008). The
first is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the performance-matched
modified Jones model following Kothari et al. (2005), and the second is the standard devia-
tion of the residual from the Dechow–Dichev (Dechow & Dichev, 2002) model. Given that
larger values of these measures indicate lower quality financial reporting, for ease of inter-
pretation, we multiply each by –1 so that each measure increases with the quality of finan-
cial reporting.7 Media, the source variable, is the natural log of the number of news items
about client i. We obtain the number of news items from the TRNA database. AudFee is
the natural log of audit fees in year t.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the coefficient b2 in Equation 1b measures the direct path
from media coverage to FRQ. The product of the coefficients a1 and b1 (a1 3 b1) measures
the indirect path from media coverage to FRQ through audit fees. Based on our hypothesis,
the product is expected to be significantly positive.8 Because Equation 1a assumes that the
auditor uses prior media coverage to approximate future media coverage of the client,
Media is measured over a period from the second quarter of the previous fiscal year to the
first quarter of the current fiscal year because audit firms typically negotiate their fees with
their clients in the first quarter of the fiscal year (Hackenbrack et al., 2014).9
To estimate our system of equations, we use the same control variables for Equations 1a
and 1b. To identify an appropriate set of controls, we draw on recent studies that examine
audit fees (e.g., André et al., 2016; Bills et al., 2017) and FRQ (e.g., Lambert et al., 2017).
For example, we control for firm size as it can affect audit fees (e.g., André et al., 2016)
as well as FRQ (e.g., Lambert et al., 2017). Rather than use the book value of total assets
which is common in many fee models (e.g., Simunic, 1980), we follow DeFond et al.
(2016) and use the client’s market value (MV) because we also want to control for the cli-
ent’s general visibility which is more related to market capitalization. Controlling for gen-
eral visibility is important in our setting because it is possible that media coverage could
just reflect firm size effect (Miller, 2006). In addition, market value is generally used in
studies examining FRQ (e.g., Hossain et al., 2017; Lambert et al., 2017). However, we note
that our results are unchanged if the book value of total assets is used instead of MV. We
also include measures of short-term liquidity, long-term default risks, and accounting per-
formance measure (Quick, InvRec, Lev, Loss, and ROA) to control for the effects of liquid-
ity and financial risks on audit pricing. Next, we control for the complexity of a firm’s
operations (NumSeg, Spit, FOps, and MA). Finally, we include auditor-related
variables—that is, auditor type (BigN), audit opinion (GC), and peak season effects
(Busy)—as additional controls.10 Appendix provides definitions for all the variables.
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Finally, we include industry fixed effects in both Equations 1a and 1b to control for
unobserved heterogeneity across industries and year fixed effects to account for transitory
economy-wide factors that could affect audit pricing decisions.
Sample and Data
Our media data is from TRNA which is a commercial database that incorporates all news
items from the Reuters Data Feed as well as items released through business-related news-
wires (e.g., PR Newswire, Business Wire, GlobeNewswire, Marketwire; Hendershött et al.
2015).11 Recent studies using this database include Hendershött et al. (2015) and Cahan
et al. (2015). We use this database to determine the number of news items about a particu-
lar client. In doing so, we rely on TRNA’s relevance rating that scores each news item in
terms of relevance to a particular firm. This is necessary because a news item that focuses
on one firm often will mention other firms (e.g., competitors, suppliers). TRNA’s relevance
score for a news story varies from 0 to 1 and equals 1 if a firm is mentioned in the headline
of the story. We select news items with a relevance score equal to 1 to ensure that the
client is the focus of a particular story.12
The data for audit fees and audit opinions come from Audit Analytics. We retrieve
merger and acquisition data from SDC while the remaining data are from Compustat. We
then combine these data. Our data requirements yield an initial sample of 22,086 firm-year
observations for the period 2003–2011. We begin in 2003 because that is the first year
when TRNA data are available. To control for the effect of outliers, all continuous vari-










Figure 1. Theoretical framework.
Note. This figure shows the theoretical framework of a path analysis that examines how media coverage (Media)
affects FRQ (FRQ) through auditors (AudFee). It also demonstrates how each path coefficient (a1, b1, and b2,
respectively) in the following equations reflect the concept of different effects in the framework:
AudFee = a0 + a1Media + akControls
k + e (1a)
FRQ = b0 + b1AudFee + b2Media + bkControls
k + e (1b)
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Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for all variables used in our analyses are reported in Panel A of
Table 1. Table 1 shows that the mean of the natural log of audit fees is 13.594 which is
equivalent to an audit fee of $801,307. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Cahan et al.,
2015), the mean of the natural log of media coverage is 3.110 which is equivalent to an
average of 22.42 news items per client per year. In untabulated results, we find the correla-
tion between lagged and current media coverage is 0.80, consistent with prior media cover-
age being a good approximation of future visibility. In Panel B, we report the pairwise
correlations between variables. To summarize, we find both Media and AudFee are posi-
tively related to our two FRQ measures. These results support our conjecture that auditors
spend audit effort to improve FRQ and media coverage is positively correlated with FRQ.
However, these are univariate correlations which do not consider the impact of other vari-
ables on FRQ we should control for or the mediation effect we try to document.
Preliminary Analyses
Before we discuss the results of our path analysis, we conduct two preliminary analyses.
First, we examine the overall effect of the media on FRQ by estimating an ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression where FRQ_DA or FRQ_DD is the dependent variable and
Media and the control variables described above are the independent variables. In the unta-
bulated results, we find the overall effect of Media on both measures of FRQ is statistically
insignificant, which is consistent with the media having opposing effects on FRQ that
offset.13
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics
Variable N M SD Q1 Median Q3
FRQ_DA 22,086 –0.116 0.156 –0.138 –0.064 –0.027
FRQ_DD 22,086 –0.069 0.111 –0.076 –0.036 –0.015
AudFee 22,086 13.594 1.271 12.719 13.624 14.434
Media 22,086 3.110 0.794 2.708 3.135 3.611
BigN 22,086 0.778 0.415 1.000 1.000 1.000
Busy 22,086 0.674 0.469 0.000 1.000 1.000
Fops 22,086 0.511 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000
GC 22,086 0.025 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.000
InvRec 22,086 0.246 0.183 0.096 0.215 0.355
Lev 22,086 0.423 1.486 0.000 0.136 0.584
Loss 22,086 0.328 0.469 0.000 0.000 1.000
MA 22,086 0.241 0.428 0.000 0.000 0.000
MV 22,086 6.166 1.980 4.792 6.161 7.487
NumSeg 22,086 2.300 1.828 1.000 1.000 3.000
Quick 22,086 2.465 2.611 1.015 1.577 2.795
ROA 22,086 –0.034 0.240 –0.038 0.034 0.077
Spit 22,086 0.662 0.473 0.000 1.000 1.000
(continued)




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Second, to consider whether AudFee has a moderating role on the relation between
Media and FRQ (rather than a mediating role), we expand our OLS model and include the
interaction between AudFee and Media. Table 2 reports the results of this analysis. The
coefficients for Media 3 AudFee are insignificant for both measures of FRQ. Thus, audit
fees do not have a moderating role in this context.
These preliminary analyses suggest the relation between Media and FRQ may be more
complex than the simple overall relation depicted by OLS. As a result, these findings sup-
port our decision to conduct a path analysis and decompose the media effect on FRQ into a
direct effect and an indirect channel that operates through auditors.14
Path Analysis
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report the results of the path analysis that examines the the-
oretical auditor-related channel we propose. We do not find any support for a direct media
corporate governance effect on FRQ after controlling for audit fees and the control vari-
ables as the coefficient for b2 in Equation 1b is not significant. This finding is consistent
Table 2. Media Coverage, Audit Fees, and FRQ (Interaction Approach).
(1) (2)
FRQ_DA FRQ_DD
Coeff. (p-value) Coeff. (p-value)
Media 3 AudFee .001 (.562) .000 (.542)
Media –.007 (.662) –.006 (.573)
AudFee .007* (.090) .005* (.066)
BigN .019*** (.000) .010*** (.001)
Busy –.006** (.022) .001 (.701)
Fops .007** (.022) .004* (.083)
GC –.050*** (.000) –.061*** (.000)
InvRec –.010 (.373) –.052*** (.000)
Lev –.000 (.803) .000 (.733)
Loss –.021*** (.000) –.002 (.511)
MA .001 (.575) .002 (.132)
MV .000 (.841) –.001 (.422)
Numseg .001** (.024) .001* (.052)
Quick –.000 (.717) .001* (.072)
ROA .146*** (.000) .062*** (.000)
Spit –.008*** (.001) –.002 (.352)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of obs. 22,086 22,086
R2 .164 .172
Note. This table reports the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is FRQ and the
independent variables are Media, the interaction of media coverage and audit fees (Media 3 AudFee), and the
control variables from Equations 1a and 1b. Column 1 reports the results when the dependent variable is FRQ_DA
and Column 2 reports the results when the dependent variable is FRQ_DD. Industry and year fixed effects are
included but not reported for brevity. See Appendix for variable definitions. p-values are calculated based on
robust standard errors clustered at the client firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. FRQ =inancial reporting quality;; OLS = ordinary least squares.
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with the media sending conflicting signals to managers regarding FRQ. On one hand,
through its watchdog, dissemination, and entertainment (i.e., tendency to sensationalize
news) roles, the media can force firms to improve their FRQ. On the other hand, the media
can expose managers to market pressure to improve their short-term financial results, lead-
ing to greater earnings manipulation and lower FRQ.
We find that, as predicted by our main hypothesis, the product of a1 3 b1 is signifi-
cantly positive for both measures, FRQ_DA and FRQ_DD (coefficient = 0.005, 0.006,
respectively, with p-values \ .01). Thus, our results are consistent with auditors increas-
ing their charges in response to more media coverage and using the additional audit fees to
increase their audit effort and improve FRQ. Specifically, we find that while the media has
a corporate governance effect in constraining managers’ opportunistic behavior (i.e., earn-
ings management), it works through auditors who increase audit effort to counteract their
higher business risk. This provides support for an indirect channel of media corporate gov-
ernance that operates through auditors.
We also note that, in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, a1 in Equation 1a which captures
the effect of media coverage on audit fees is positive and significant. Furthermore, b1 in
Equation 1b is positive and significant which indicates that higher audit fees are associated
with better FRQ. Thus, we find support for the two legs that underlie the indirect channel.15
A possible concern about our main analysis is that media coverage is correlated with the
client’s general visibility which is a function of firm size. Asthana and Kalelkar (2014)
Table 3. Path Analysis of Media Coverage, Audit Fees, and FRQ.
(1) (2)
FRQ_DA FRQ_DD
Predicted sign Coeff. (p-value) Coeff. (p-value)
P(Media, AudFee) = a1 + .074*** (.000) .074*** (.000)
P(AudFee, FRQ) = b1 + .070*** (.000) .078*** (.000)
P(Media, FRQ)
H1: Direct = b2 ? .009 (.220) .001 (.919)
H2: Indirect = a1 3 b1 + .005*** (.000) .006*** (.000)
Control variables Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of obs. 22,086 22,086
x2GoF/df 1.47 1.41
Note. This table reports the results from a path analysis that examines how media coverage affects FRQ. We
estimate the following equations:
AudFee= a0 + a1Media+ akControls
k + e (1a)
FRQ= b0 + b1AudFee+ b2Media+ bkControls
k + e (1b)
FRQ represents the proxies for FRQ, that is, FRQ_DA and FRQ_DD. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for
Equations 1a and 1b. P(X1, X2) stands for the standardized path coefficients. Constant terms, control variables,
and fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. See Appendix for variable definitions. The significance
of the indirect effect is estimated using the Sobel (1982) test statistics. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FRQ = financial reporting quality.
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argue and find evidence that the increase of a client’s general visibility, measured by the
addition of a client to S&P 500 index, leads to lower audit fees. However, theoretically,
media coverage differs from the firm’s general visibility. First, a firm’s general visibility
cannot sensationalize an auditor’s role in an accounting failure, but the media can slant the
news and portray the auditor’s involvement in a negative light (e.g., Cohen et al., 2016).
Second, media can make less visible firms (e.g., firms with small size) more visible.
Empirically, we find the correlation between MV and Media is 0.48, suggesting that, while
related, they capture different aspects of visibility of a client. In addition, the finding of
prior literature on the relationship between a client’s general visibility and audit fees is
inconsistent with ours. As documented in this article, we find the client’s media coverage
increases audit fees.16
Cross-Sectional Analysis
In this section, we perform a cross-sectional analysis to further support our finding that the
media’s role in improving FRQ mainly works through auditors. Specifically, as we argued
in the previous section, the media can exert pressure on managers to manipulate earnings.
If so, we expect the indirect channel of media corporate governance will be more pro-
nounced when the media pressure on a client is high. Empirically, we use the number of
earnings-related news items to measure such pressure following Dai et al. (2016).
Empirically, we divide our sample into two groups based on the sample median value of
the number of earnings-related news items which captures to what extent information about
the firm’s financial performance is exposed to the public (Beyer et al., 2010).
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the path analysis for the four subsamples. For
both measures of clients’ FRQ, we find that the mediation effect of audit fees on the rela-
tionship between a client’s media coverage and its FRQ is stronger when media pressure
on manager’s misreporting is higher. For example, when FRQ_DA is the dependent vari-
able, the indirect effect of the media on FRQ is 0.008 for the group with more earnings-
related news and 0.004 for the group with less earnings-related news, and the difference is
significant at the 10% level.17
Endogeneity Tests
Although we have addressed the concern that a client’s general visibility or size may be
driving our results, readers may still be concerned about endogeneity problems. In our set-
ting, one type of endogeneity issue, reverse causality, is not likely to explain our results for
two reasons. First, we already use the media coverage over the year prior to when the fee
is set in performing all of our tests, consistent with a lag-lead approach. Furthermore, given
media coverage of a firm could be persistent, we re-estimate Equations 1a and 1b after
including audit fees paid in the previous year (AudFeei,t-1) as additional control in Equation
1a. Our results remain unchanged (untabulated). Second, we calculate media coverage over
an entire year rather than in a short window at the time the audit fee is disclosed to the
public. It is unlikely that audit fees would generate much news outside the time they are
initially disclosed. Thus, our findings do not appear to be purely driven by reverse
causality.18
However, two endogeneity concerns require further attention. First, it is possible that the
improvement in FRQ is driven by a client’s demand for high-quality audits rather than
an auditor’s own incentive. Second, even though we control for a battery of firm






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































characteristics especially the general visibility in our regression analysis, it is still possible
that other omitted variables may explain our results. Consequently, we conduct a series of
additional tests to address these two specific endogeneity issues.
Clients’ Demand for High-Quality Audits
Although we do not find a direct effect of media coverage on FRQ, our finding of a posi-
tive media coverage effect on audit fees and FRQ is consistent with an alternative corporate
governance view where the media creates client demand for more audit work. More specifi-
cally, a client can be concerned that an audit failure may lead to litigation or reputation
damage, and as a result, the client may demand more audit work (and pay more audit fees)
unilaterally, resulting in improved FRQ. To address this alternative explanation, we con-
duct two additional tests.
First, we directly control for clients’ litigation risk in Equation 1a. Following Kim and
Skinner (2012), we use the estimation results of their model (2) and construct a firm-year
litigation measure. In addition, we follow Dai et al. (2015) and use the client’s corporate
social responsibility performance, based on KLD Research and Analytics, as a time-specific
measure of the client’s reputation. Our results should not hold after including these mea-
sures if our findings are purely driven by the client’s response to its own litigation and rep-
utation risks that arise because of greater media exposure. While our sample size decreases
after adding the additional controls, we continue to find that media coverage is positively
correlated with audit fees after controlling for the client’s litigation and reputation risk.
Furthermore, results continue to support a mediated relation where the effect of media cov-
erage on clients’ FRQ runs through audit fees (untabulated).19
Our second test to mitigate the client demand explanation focuses on the client’s internal
governance. Engel et al. (2010) find that audit committee quality is positively correlated
with audit fees, suggesting firms with good internal corporate governance systems may
demand higher quality audit services. Hence, if the alternative view is true, intensive media
exposure could lead to improvements in a client’s corporate governance—for example,
audit committee quality—and, as a result, the client demands and purchases more audit ser-
vices, leading to higher fees and FRQ accordingly.
To address this conjecture, we directly control for clients’ corporate governance in our
path analysis. Empirically, we use three corporate governance measures: (a) audit commit-
tee size (number of audit committee members scaled by total number of directors, a proxy
for monitoring demand), (b) the percentage of financial experts on the audit committee
(number of directors with accounting or finance background scaled by total number of
directors in audit committee, a proxy for monitoring quality), and (c) the audit committee’s
total compensation (Engel et al., 2010). Untabulated results indicate that media coverage is
still positively correlated with audit fees after controlling for the above proxies for internal
governance quality, and the effect of media coverage on FRQ that is mediated by audit
fees remains positive and significant in the path analysis, even though our sample size is
reduced due to the additional control variables.
Overall, the evidence does not support an alternative interpretation where the positive
impact of media coverage on FRQ is mainly driven by the clients’ incentive for higher
audit quality. However, we acknowledge that the incentive to avoid future misreporting or
scrutiny is a common interest for both the client and auditor, and FRQ in equilibrium is the
outcome of a mutual agreement between these parties. Even so, our results are consistent
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with auditors having stronger incentives to improve FRQ because, as discussed, clients face
conflicting incentives in the face of media coverage.
Omitted Variables
To further address omitted variables in general and establish causality, we use the follow-
ing four approaches.
1. Residual of media coverage. We first use the residual from a media coverage
determinant model and examine whether the residual of media coverage still plays
a role in audit pricing and clients’ FRQ. Specifically, we follow Dai et al. (2015)
and include the following firm characteristics as the determinants of news cover-
age at the firm level: trade frequency, firm size, market-to-book ratio, annual
stock return, stock return volatility, research and development expense, return on
assets, and index membership. Following Miller (2006), we also include analyst
following, and based on Solomon and Soltes (2012), we include an indicator for
clients with small, positive earnings surprises. It is expected that the residuals
from the first-stage determinant model (R_Media) are less likely to capture the
firm characteristics that are related to media coverage. We re-estimate our
Equations 1a and 1b by replacing Media with R_Media. Our sample reduces to
13,470 because of additional data requirements.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results. We find the product of a1 3 b1 is significant at
the 1% level in both the FRQ_DA and FRQ_DD models, suggesting that there is an indirect
effect of the media coverage residuals on clients’ FRQ that runs through audit fees. In addi-
tion, we do not find any evidence that the direct effect of media coverage on FRQ (b2) is
significant in either model.
2. IV analysis. As an alternative approach to tease out the effect of the firm-level
endogenous determinants on media coverage, we use an IV analysis. A number of
papers, including Gurun and Butler (2012) and Dai et al. (2015), argue that infor-
mation gathering and processing (which are at the heart of media coverage) can be
done more easily when the physical distance between the firm and news outlets is
shorter. In contrast, no economic intuition directly links this instrument to audit
fees, which supports the exclusion restriction for this instrument. Following Gurun
and Butler (2012) and Dai et al. (2015), our IV, DJS, is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if a client’s headquarters is located in the same state as one of Dow
Jones’ regional offices, and 0 otherwise. In the first stage, we regress Media on
our control variables from Equation 1a and DJS. Then, we calculate the predicted
value of media coverage and use this instrumented measure of media coverage
(^Media) to re-estimate Equations 1a and 1b.
Panel B of Table 5 shows the results of our two-stage IV analysis. As in Dai et al.
(2015), untabulated results show that the measure for geographic proximity, DJS, is posi-
tively associated with Media. Following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we reject the null
hypothesis of weak instrument with Kleibergen–Paap Wald F-statistic equal to 12.47 with
p-value less than .001 (Stock & Yogo, 2005). In the second stage, the indirect effects of
instrumented media coverage on clients’ FRQ via increased audit fees (a1 3 b1) are also
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Table 5. Additional Endogeneity Tests.
Panel A. Residual of Media Coverage.
FRQ_DA FRQ_DD
Predicted sign Coeff. (p-value) Coeff. (p-value)
P(Media, AudFee) = a1 + .085*** (.000) .085*** (.000)
P(AudFee, FRQ) = b1 + .069*** (.000) .075*** (.000)
P(Media, FRQ)
H1: Direct = b2 ? .013 (.121) .010 (.240)
H2: Indirect = a1 3 b1 + .006*** (.000) .006*** (.000)
Control variables Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of obs. 13,470 13,470
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Approach.
FRQ_DA FRQ_DD
Predicted sign Coeff. (p-value) Coeff. (p-value)
P(^Media, AudFee) = a1 + .033*** (.000) .033*** (.000)
P(AudFee, FRQ) = b1 + .073*** (.000) .080*** (.000)
P(^Media, FRQ)
H1: Direct = b2 ? –.005 (.427) –.010 (.116)
H2: Indirect = a1 3 b1 + .002*** (.000) .003*** (.000)
Control variables Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of obs. 22,086 22,086
Panel C. Quasi-Natural Experiment.
FRQ_DA FRQ_DD
Predicted sign Coeff. (p-value) Coeff. (p-value)
P(Closure, AudFee) = a1 – –.012** (.036) –.012** (.036)
P(AudFee, FRQ) = b1 + .119*** (.000) .129*** (.000)
P(Closure, FRQ)
H1: Direct = b2 ? .003 (.812) –.006 (.615)
H2: Indirect = a1 3 b1 – –.001** (.050) –.002** (.049)
Control variables Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of obs. 7,247 7,247
Note. This table reports the results of regressions for the path analysis (Equations 1a and 1b) for four tests that
address endogeneity issues. Panel A reports the results of the path analysis when the residual of media coverage is
used. We follow Dai et al. (2015) to estimate the first-stage determinant model to estimate the residuals. Panel B
reports the results using an instrumented media coverage where the instrument is an indicator variable that is
equal to 1 if the client’s home state has Dow Jones regional news office. Panel C reports the results of a quasi-
natural experiment based on the closure of major daily newspapers in Colorado and Maryland. P(X1, X2) stands
for the standardized path coefficients. Constant terms, control variables, and fixed effects are included but not
reported for brevity. See Appendix for variable definitions. The significance of the indirect effect is estimated using
the Sobel (1982) test statistics. x2GoF/df is less than 2 for all models. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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found to be significant at the 1% level in both models. The direct effect of the instrumented
Media variable (b2) remains statistically insignificant.
20
3. Quasi-natural experiment. The third approach to strengthen identification of the
media’s indirect corporate governance effect relies on a natural experiment that
uses an exogenous shock that changes media coverage. The shocks we utilize are
two local newspaper closures in Colorado and Maryland. On February 27, 2009,
the Rocky Mountain News, a daily newspaper published in Denver, Colorado,
announced its closure, leaving the Denver Post as the sole remaining large-
circulation daily. On February 15, 2009, the Baltimore Examiner, one of the two
big dailies in Baltimore, Maryland, had its last issue. We contend that the closures
of these two major local newspapers reduced the media coverage of firms located
in Colorado and Maryland, but have no plausible direct effect on auditors’ beha-
vior or the media coverage of firms in other states.21 In addition, the untabulated
results show that after 1 year of the closure of these two major local newspapers,
the media coverage of firms in Colorado and Maryland was reduced by 5.66% of
the mean value prior to the closures. Therefore, these two events meet the criteria
of an exogenous shock.
To perform our audit fee tests, we set Closure equal to 1 for the firm-year observations
located in Colorado and Maryland after 2009, and 0 otherwise. We then re-estimate
Equations 1a and 1b by replacing Media with Closure and use observations from 2008 to
2010, that is, the year of the closures and the preceding and subsequent years, in order that
it could mitigate the concern that our results are affected by confounding events using a
longer testing period.22 In contrast to Media, we expect that Closure will have a negative
effect on audit fees and that the indirect path from Closure to FRQ will be negative. Panel
C of Table 5 reports the results. We find the coefficient on the indirect effect from Closure
to FRQ (a1 3 b1) is negatively significant at less than 10% level across all four columns,
indicating that the decline in media coverage is associated with a decline in FRQ.
Meanwhile, the coefficient on the direct effect (b2) remains insignificant.
The central issue addressed in this section relates to the potential endogeneity of the
media coverage variable itself. The results of various analyses in this section continue to
show that the media has an indirect corporate governance role on FRQ that operates
through auditors. Although none of these tests is individually able to rule out all possible
alternative explanations, taken together, the results suggest that it is less likely that our
main findings are client-driven or purely due to omitted variables.
Additional Analyses
Robustness Tests
We examine the robustness of our main results. First, we examine whether the media leads
auditors to ultimately constrain both income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals. As
we discussed in the previous section, while media pressure can give managers incentive to
inflate current earnings upward or manipulate current earnings downward to increase
reported numbers in the future periods, auditors should be motivated to reduce both types
of earnings management. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 report the results. We find that
the mediated effect of media coverage on FRQ (a1 3 b1) is indeed positive and significant



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































when we focus on the subsample with income-increasing (positive) discretionary accruals,
indicating an indirect corporate governance role for the media in constraining income-
increasing accruals via auditors. This result is consistent with prior literature that auditors
are conservative for the firms with income-increasing accruals (Francis & Krishnan, 1999).
In our context, auditors spend more effort to reduce income-increasing accruals when the
clients’ media visibility is higher.
Furthermore, we find the mediated effect of media coverage on FRQ (a1 3 b1) is also
positive and significant when we focus on the subsample with income-decreasing (nega-
tive) discretionary accruals. It suggests the media also has an indirect role in constraining
income-decreasing accruals via auditors. This result is consistent with the prior literature
that finds auditors tend to reduce downward earnings management (e.g., Francis et al.,
1999; Reynolds & Francis, 2000; Myers et al., 2003). These studies argue that auditors
have incentive to reduce both income-increasing and decreasing accruals because while
income-increasing accruals can be used to inflate current earnings, income-decreasing
accruals can be used to create ‘‘cookie jar reserves’’ that can be used to increase future
earnings.
Next, we address concerns about estimation errors in computing the FRQ_DA and
FRQ_DD proxies (Dechow et al., 2010). Specifically, we use a restatement indicator,
FRQ_Restate, that equals 0 if a client misreports its financial statements in year t, and 1
otherwise. Furthermore, we use an indicator, FRQ_MeetBeat, that equals 0 for clients that
meet or just beat their consensus analyst forecast by one cent in year t, and 1 otherwise.
Like FRQ_DA and FRQ_DD, FRQ_Restate and FRQ_MeetBeat are increasing in FRQ.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 report the results. Consistent with the main results, the
mediated effect of media coverage on FRQ (a1 3 b1) is positive and significant, indicating
an indirect corporate governance role for the media on restatements and manipulation
around earnings thresholds.23 Also, we find evidence supporting the media’s dark side as
b2 is negative and significant in the FRQ_MeetBeat specification. That is, greater media
coverage is directly associated with a higher likelihood of earnings manipulations around
analysts’ earnings forecasts. However, this direct effect is offset, at least partly, by auditors
who indirectly extend the media’s corporate governance role.
Validation Tests
In our hypothesis development, we argue that litigation risk and potential market share loss
are two important channels in explaining the positive relation between audit fee and media
coverage. These tests assume that the media’s reporting of an auditor’s poor-quality audits
can lead to more litigation and reputation damage ex post. In this section, we conduct two
tests to examine the validity of this assumption. Following prior literature (e.g., Hennes
et al., 2008), we use clients’ accounting restatements as an indicator of poor audit quality.
We first examine our assumption that greater media coverage of poor audit quality
increases the likelihood that an auditor will be sued. To perform such a test, we collect
data on lawsuits against auditors from the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. We
create an indicator variable, Sued, that is equal to 1 if the auditor was sued by shareholders
within 1 year after a client’s restatement. We also develop an indicator variable for high
media coverage, HMedia1, based on whether the media coverage of a client is above sample
median in year t. We construct an accounting restatement indicator, Restate, which is 1 if a
client restates in year t and 0 otherwise. We regress the interaction term HMedia1 3 Restate
on whether the auditor is sued in the next year (Sued), including the control variables with
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year fixed effects. Because our dependent variable, Sued, is a dummy variable, a logistic
regression is used to estimate the likelihood of being sued in the year. To mitigate the poten-
tial concern that a regular fixed effects logit model will produce inconsistent estimates, we
use Chamberlain’s random effects (CRE) logit estimation (Wooldridge, 2002). In the untabu-
lated tests, we find the coefficient of the interaction term HMedia1 3 Restate is significantly
positive at the 1% level, indicating that auditors of restating clients with higher media cover-
age have higher litigation risk than auditors of restating clients with lower media coverage.
Our second test investigates the effects of reputational damage by examining the audi-
tor’s loss in local market share following a client restatement. Because market share
requires a market, we follow Swanquist and Whited (2015) who examine whether auditor
city offices that have restating clients suffer a larger decrease in local market share than
city offices with no restating clients. We examine whether a city office with a restating
client suffers a significantly larger loss in its local market share if the clients in the city
office have greater media coverage. If a city office has a restating client, Restate_C is
coded 1. We measure the city office’s local market shares using the city office’s audit fees
(or total audit and non-audit fees) scaled by the total audit fees (or total audit and non-audit
fees) of all auditors in the same city. We calculate the change in market share of an auditor
from year t to t + 1. We also develop an indicator variable for high media coverage,
HMedia2, based on whether the average media coverage of all clients in one auditor city
office is above sample median in year t. We then regress the change in the city office’s
market share on the interaction term HMedia2 3 Restate_C, the control variables, and year
and auditor-city office fixed effects. We compute market share measure based on audit
fees. The untabulated results show that the coefficient of the interaction HMedia2 3
Restate_C is significantly negative. These results provide evidence that the ex post market
share loss following a restatement is greater when media coverage is high.
Conclusion
We propose that the media could have an indirect corporate governance role on FRQ that
operates through auditors. We posit that auditors care about their clients’ media coverage
because greater media exposure can increase the auditor’s litigation risk and reputation risk
associated with future audit failures. To address this risk ex ante, we expect auditors to
increase audit fees of clients who have greater media coverage. Furthermore, we expect
that at least part of higher audit fees will be used to increase audit effort and improve the
client’s FRQ, resulting in lower business risk for the auditor. Using a path analysis, we find
that media coverage is positively associated with audit fees and that audit fees mediate the
association between the client’s media coverage and FRQ, consistent with the media
having an indirect effect on FRQ.
Overall, our study provides a more nuanced understanding of the media’s corporate gov-
ernance role. While the focus of prior studies has been on how the media directly disci-
plines managers and their boards, as Miller and Skinner (2015) suggest, little is known
about how the media interacts with other capital market participants, such as information
intermediaries and monitors, and whether such interactions can enhance the media’s corpo-
rate governance role. Our study suggests that the media has a corporate governance role for
FRQ but that it operates through auditors.
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Table A1. Variable Definitions.
Variable Definition Data source
Outcome variables
FRQ_DA Absolute value of discretionary accrual from the
performance-matched modified Jones model from
Kothari et al. (2005) in year t, multiplied by –1.
Compustat
FRQ_DD The SD of the residual from the Dechow and Dichev
(2002) model in year t, multiplied by –1.
Compustat
Source variable
Media The natural logarithm of the number of news items from
the beginning of the second quarter of year t – 1 to the




AudFee The natural logarithm of total audit fee (in $) in year t. Audit Analytics
Control variables for Equations 1a and 1b
BigN 1 If the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm in year t, 0
otherwise.
Audit Analytics
Busy 1 If the fiscal year end is December in year t, 0 otherwise. Compustat
Fops 1 If the firm has a foreign operation in year t, 0 otherwise. Compustat
GC 1 If the firm receives a going concern opinion in year t, 0
otherwise.
Audit Analytics
InvRec Sum of inventories and receivables, divided by beginning
total assets in year t.
Compustat
Loss 1 If the firm reports a loss in year t, 0 otherwise. Compustat
Lev Total debt to equity ratio in year t. Compustat
MA 1 If the firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition in year t,
0 otherwise.
SDC
MV The natural logarithm of market capitalization in year t. Compustat
NumSeg The number of business segments in year t. Compustat
Quick Current assets minus inventories, divided by current
liabilities in year t.
Compustat
ROA Income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets
in year t.
Compustat
Spit 1 If the firm reports a special item in year t, 0 otherwise. Compustat
Additional variables for endogeneity tests and additional analyses
Closure 1 If the firm is located in Colorado or Maryland and year t
is after 2009, 0 otherwise.
FRQ_MeetBeat 0 If the firm’s reported earnings is equal to or just beats
its consensus analyst forecast by one cent in year t, 1
otherwise.
IBES
FRQ_Restate 0 If the firm misreports its financial statement in year t, 1
otherwise.
Audit Analytics
R_Media The residual of Media estimated from the first-stage




20 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
Acknowledgments
We gratefully acknowledge comments from one anonymous reviewer, Claudio Bonilla, Elizabeth
Carson, Mariela Carvajal, Kun-Chih Chen, Mark Clatworthy, Andrew Ferguson, Neil Fargher, Jere
Francis, Wen He, Tuan Ho, Audrey Hsu, Andrew Jackson, Steve Kaplan, Chih-Hsien Liao, Harold
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1. We use media exposure, media coverage, and media visibility interchangeably in our paper.
2. A direct effect refers to the effect of A causing B. An indirect, or mediated, effect refers to a
relationship between A and B, whereas A causes M, which in turn causes B.
3. Path analysis is widely used in behavioral and health sciences (Hayes, 2013), as well as several
recent accounting studies (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2012; DeFond et al., 2016; Hilary et al.,
2016). Path analysis aims to capture the mediation effect, which will inform the researchers how
or why such an effect occurs. It is different from the interaction term in ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression which is designed to capture the moderation effect. As discussed in the
‘‘Preliminary Analyses’’ section, when we run an OLS regression with the interaction term
between audit fees and media coverage included, the interaction is insignificant. Thus, our path
analysis is not merely capturing a disguised moderation effect where audit fees moderates the
relation between media coverage and financial reporting quality (FRQ).
4. The insignificant direct effect of media can be explained by the two different effects of media on
financial reporting. On one hand, the media can provide early detection of fraud in some cases
(Dyck et al., 2010; Miller, 2006), at least for earnings manipulations that have already occurred.
This will be transferred into a monitoring mechanism that curbs earnings management in
advance. On the other hand, media visibility can also have a ‘‘dark side’’ (Dai et al., 2016;
Malmendier & Tate, 2009) where media coverage creates incentives and pressure for managers
to manipulate earnings. Therefore, the two competing force may make the direct effect of the
media on FRQ ambiguous.
5. Miller and Skinner (2015) argue that ‘‘[f]uture research would benefit from a more complete
theory of the role of the media in financial markets’’ (p. 232). They suggest that a ‘‘promising
approach is to consider the media’s interaction with other players in the financial markets’
including auditors.’’
Cahan et al. 21
6. We recognize that prior research has examined these legs independently. For example, Gong
et al. (2018) provide some evidence on the relation between media coverage and audit fees,
while Eshleman and Guo (2014) study the relation between audit fees and audit quality. Our
study is distinct from these prior studies because we examine these relations as part of a single
conceptual model.
7. In additional analyses, we use two alternative measures of FRQ based on restatements and meet-
ing/just beating analysts’ forecasts to mitigate the estimation errors in the models used to mea-
sure discretionary accruals and Dechow–Dichev residual (Dechow et al., 2010). We do not use
restatements or meeting/just beating earnings as our primary measures for two reasons. First, the
binary and infrequent nature of these measures fails to capture subtle variations in FRQ which
limits their generalizability and reduces their ability to detect cross-sectional and time-series var-
iations in the effect of media coverage on FRQ (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). Second, the meeting/
just beating measure can only be computed for firms covered by equity analysts and I/B/E/S
database which may tend to understate the effect of media (Bushee et al., 2010).
8. We follow DeFond and Zhang (2014) and consider (a) audit fees as audit inputs and (b) FRQ
being constrained by firms’ innate characteristics, confounded by the reporting system, and
affected by audit inputs. While both audit fees and FRQ measures can be viewed as measures of
audit quality, they are not identical. DeFond and Zhang (2014) state that ‘‘an increase in audit
fees cannot be unambiguously interpreted as an increase in audit quality’’ (p. 290) because audit
fees also capture risk premia and reflect audit efficiency. Similarly, they note that measures of
FRQ are ‘‘determined by many factors and audit quality is just one component’’ (DeFond &
Zhang, 2014, p. 288).
9. Our results are not sensitive to measuring media coverage over either the entire previous or cur-
rent fiscal year.
10. Our results are not affected if we further control for investment opportunities (e.g., book-to-
market ratio), external financing, and advertising expense in our baseline models as these addi-
tional control variables could be correlated with media coverage and audit pricing.
11. According to Hendershött et al. (2015), the most common topics covered in the news stories are
(in order): corporate forecasts, corporate results, corporate crises, debt markets, stock markets,
major breaking news, corporate bonds, mergers and acquisitions, macro news, business activities,
corporate analysis, hot stocks, regulation, government policies, legislation, fund industry news,
broker research and recommendations, ratings, new issues, job losses and unemployment, and
management issues and policy. To tease out the pure media effects, we exclude the firm-initiated
news from our analysis.
12. We also check if our results are sensitive to the selection criteria of relevance score. In particular,
we follow Hendershött et al. (2015) to include all the news of one particular firm and construct a
yearly weighted number of news article measure using the relevance measure as weights. We
find our results are robust to this alternative measure.
13. To conserve space, we do not report the untabulated results in detail, but they are available on
request.
14. In a traditional mediation analysis (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986), the overall effect of X on Y (in
our case, Media and FRQ, respectively) needs to be significant. However, Collins et al. (1998)
argue that it is not necessary to show a significant total effect as a first step if one is investigating
a stage-sequential process that unfolds over time. Although their setting is different from ours, sim-
ilar to theirs, our process unfolds at three points in time: in our case, the media reports on a client,
the auditor sets fees given media coverage, and the auditor determines FRQ given audit fees.
15. The overall fit of the causal model as a whole can be assessed using a goodness-of-fit chi-square
(x2GoF). However, because x
2
GoF is very sensitive to the sample size, the x
2
GoF is often deflated
by its degrees of freedom where a x2GoF/df. of 2 or less is an indicator of a good fitting model
(e.g., Norman & Streiner, 2003). The x2GoF/df for the FRQ_DA and FRQ_DD models are 1.47
and 1.41, respectively.
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16. We conduct two additional analyses to address the concern that our tests are merely detecting a
residual size effect that is related to the client’s general visibility. First, to account for the fact
that our media measures could still proxy for high-order influences of firm size that are not cap-
tured by the linear influence of our control variables, we follow Focke et al. (2017) and include
size splines based on the annual decile of firm size in our regressions. Second, we follow Hilary
et al. (2014) and delete observations that have both bigger firm size and greater media coverage
(i.e., those for which both MV and Media are greater than their sample median values). In this
case, the correlation between MV and Media becomes 0.05 so that the concern that our media
coverage captures the effect of size is mitigated. In all cases (results untabulated), our baseline
results remain unchanged, suggesting that our results are not being driven by a residual size
effect that is related to general visibility.
17. In an additional analysis, we investigate whether media’s indirect effect on FRQ emanates from
its creation of original information or from it disseminating existing information more broadly.
Using the novelty score from Thomson Reuters News Analytics (TRNA) which reflects whether
a news item j was preceded by a related news item k in a window period (e.g., 12 hr, 24 hr, 3
days, 5 days, 7 days) before the release of j, we define a news item as an ‘‘original news’’ item
if it is not linked (related) to prior news items in the previous 24 hr and as ‘‘stale news’’ item if
it is linked to prior news items in the previous 24 hr. After classifying each news item as original
or stale, we recalculate the media coverage for each firm-year and create two new variables to
capture the volume of original and stale news, respectively. Next, we orthogonalize the two mea-
sures to mitigate multicollinearity as these two variables are naturally highly correlated. We con-
duct our path analysis using the measures of original and stale news in place of Media. In
untabulated results, we find that the auditor’s business risk is affected by both the media’s infor-
mation creation role and dissemination role.
18. Although the likelihood is remote, another scenario for reverse causality is that better financial
reporting quality and greater auditor effort of a firm could reduce information acquisition costs
of outsiders (e.g., media) and hence attract more media coverage. Our tests in the ‘‘Omitted
Variables’’ section that explore the exogenous sources of variations in media coverage with
respect to FRQ and audit fees (e.g., instrumental variable [IV] and difference-in-difference test)
help address this potential concern (e.g., Glaeser & Guay, 2017).
19. One can argue that Kim and Skinner’s (2012) measure may capture the overall litigation risk of
both clients and their auditors. If so, by controlling for overall litigation risk, we underestimate
the role of the auditor’s business risks arising from media coverage. At the same time, the signif-
icant results we obtained after controlling for clients’ overall litigation risks provide us with
more confidence that our findings cannot be explained by clients’ litigation concerns that result
in a higher demand for audit effort. This reasoning also applies to the concern that a client’s cor-
porate social responsibility performance could be potentially related to auditor reputation risk.
20. One potential criticism of our IV, DJS, is that it may be potentially correlated with the state-
level economic development as most of Dow Jones regional offices are located in large cities in
the more developed areas where audit fees are higher due to their higher cost of living and labor
usage. To further alleviate this concern, we develop an alternative IV, Reporters, which is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of news reporters in one particular state scaled by
state-level population is greater than the median value, and 0 otherwise. Conceptually, this IV
controls for the effect of economic development at the state level. The untabulated results show
that our findings are qualitatively unchanged.
21. According to the summarized information in Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List_of_defunct_newspapers_of_the_United_States), there are thousands of defunct newspapers
in the United States. We choose the Rocky Mountain News and the Baltimore Examiner as our
major events as their circulations are ranked the top two among all the defunct newspapers. The
Rocky Mountain News had a circulation of 255,427 in 2006 and the Baltimore Examiner had a
circulation of 236,000 in 2008.
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22. Our findings are not affected when we use the full sample period.
23. To mitigate the potential reverse causality issue, we further control for whether a client misre-
ports its financial statements in the last year (i.e., lagged value of FRQ_Restate) in the
FRQ_Restate specifications. Doing so can also help highlight the component of audit effort
(rather than risk premium) in audit fee. In addition, given the identification of misreporting cases
is purely ex post (e.g., based on the restatement announcements issued after a certain misreport-
ing period), we restrict our testing period till 2008 in order that we have a measurement window
with reasonable length (i.e., at least 3 years) between the potential misreporting period and the
restatement announcement date. Our results are not affected if we restrict our testing sample till
2009 or 2010.
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